example, framing of outcomes in positive or negative The competitive market simulation (Bazerman, Mag-terms has been shown to affect negotiators perforliozzi, & Neale, 1985) was used to explore anchoring mance and total profit (Bazerman, Magliozzi, & Neale, effects in negotiation. Two possible anchoring effects 1985; Neale & Northcraft, 1986). Other biases, such as were examined in the present study. One effect in-undue reliance on readily available information, and volved the profit schedule format; although individual overconfidence in judgment have also been shown to buyers or sellers, engage in a simulated negotiation with as many partners as possible in a fixed period of time. Agreements negotiated in this market involve a combination of three different attributes, varying in Negotiation is a continual process of decision makrelative importance for buyers and sellers. While indiing. Participants in negotiation perceive and interpret vidual profit schedules place all participants in normathe information available to them and proceed to act tively equivalent power positions, different variables on these perceptions. Not surprisingly, negotiators are susceptible to judgmental biases documented in nu-related to judgmental heuristics are manipulated bemerous studies of individual decision making. Indeed, tween subjects, to test for their effect on negotiation negotiation research (Neale & Bazerman, 1992) uncov-outcomes. ered systematic departures from rationality. Thus, for One variable extensively studied using the integrative bargaining paradigm is the impact of predetermined goals. Negotiators with specified difficult goals Address reprint requests to Ilana Ritov, Department of Industrial were generally more profitable than negotiators with Engineering and Management, Ben-Gurion University, POB 653, Be'er-Sheva, Israel.
buyers or sellers, engage in a simulated negotiation with as many partners as possible in a fixed period of time. Agreements negotiated in this market involve a combination of three different attributes, varying in Negotiation is a continual process of decision makrelative importance for buyers and sellers. While indiing. Participants in negotiation perceive and interpret vidual profit schedules place all participants in normathe information available to them and proceed to act tively equivalent power positions, different variables on these perceptions. Not surprisingly, negotiators are susceptible to judgmental biases documented in nu-related to judgmental heuristics are manipulated bemerous studies of individual decision making. Indeed, tween subjects, to test for their effect on negotiation negotiation research (Neale & Bazerman, 1992) uncov-outcomes. ered systematic departures from rationality. Thus, for
One variable extensively studied using the integrative bargaining paradigm is the impact of predetermined goals. Negotiators with specified difficult goals Hypothesis 2. Initiators achieve higher outcomes than non-initi- Northcraft, 1986; Huber & Neale, 1986 , Neale, 1987 .
ators.
These findings reaffirm earlier results concerning the impact of goal setting in negotiation (Pruitt 1981 , PROFIT SCHEDULE FORMAT 1983 . While earlier research attributed the impact of preset goals to increased utilization of problem solving While framing induced by social context may be instrategies by negotiators under difficult constraints volved in producing the asymmetry between buyers (Pruitt, 1981) , later studies raised the hypothesis that and sellers, a closer examination of participants' profit the assigned goals provide anchors which affect potenschedule formats suggests the possible influence of task tial outcome evaluation (Huber & Neale, 1986) . characteristics as well. In the Bazerman et al. (1985) While anchoring negotiation on the initial offer or a competitive market simulation, profit levels are prepreassigned goal may be a consciously motivated prosented either in descending or in ascending order. If cess, anchoring could on other occasions be automatic the buyer's list typically starts at the highest profit and unintended. For example, in a study of willingness level and the seller's list starts at the lowest profit level, to pay (WTP) for environmental cause Kahneman and then the task characteristics of the two participants Knetsch (1993) showed that the amount mentioned in are not cognitively identical. To the extent that the top the initial question had a large effect on respondents ' of the list provides an automatic anchor for further estimate of the average WTP in the population, but it processing, anchoring bias implies that high starting had no effect on their estimate of the proportion of point will eventually generate higher profit. Hence, a households that would pay a given amount. Thus, the buyer's advantage would be predicted merely on the anchor's impact appears to be controlled by surface basis of this superficial difference in schedule formats. matching of the anchor and the required response.
Although Neale et al. (1987) showed that the buyers' Such format effect indicates that anchoring, in this advantage can be eliminated if the role titles are case, is caused by a relatively primitive cognitive operachanged, their study does not preclude the possibility tion. Similarly automatic anchoring may also occur in that the difference between buyers' and sellers' profit the integrative bargaining studies.
is affected by the profit schedule format, as well as by social role perception. If buyers outperform sellers at
INITIATOR ADVANTAGE
least partly due to format differences in profit schedIn most reported research employing this paradigm ules, the effect should diminish or even reverse for inbuyers outperformed sellers. This result was unpre-verted format schedules. In the present study profit dicted, since the profit schedules for buyers and sellers schedule formats are experimentally manipulated, in this market simulation were completely symmetri-thus providing an opportunity to test the following hycal. According to the rational model, the subject's ran-pothesis: domly assigned role as buyer or seller should have no Hypothesis 3. Schedule format affects final agreement, so that effect on her gained profit. Neale and her associates participants with decreasing schedule achieve higher profits (Neale, Huber, & Northcraft, 1987; Neale & Bazerman, than participants with increasing schedules. In particular, the 1991) offer an explanation involving the notion of natuadvantage of buyers over sellers will be reduced if the sellers' schedule is decreasing, and the buyers' schedule increasing. ral differences in framing, due to social influences. By this argument, sellers conceptualize their role as one which initiates action, in order to gains resources. Buy-
INITIAL OFFERS
ers, on the other hand, tend to frame transactions in terms of loss. Consequently, sellers are more risk
The factors pertaining to negotiation outcomes, averse and more willing to reach a compromise than namely the asymetry between initiators and non-initiabuyers. This asymmetry in framing yields the robust tors and the impact of profit schedule format, are apt finding of buyers' advantage. Neale et al. (1987) pro-to shape initial offers as well as final outcomes. First, vided indirect support for their account, by showing it seems reasonable to assume that initiators' edge over that the buyer's advantage was eliminated when as-their opponents would be even more pronounced in the signed roles were described by non-words rather then comparison of initial offer values than in final profits: ''buyers'' and ''sellers''. The present study will directly initiators would tend to propose initial offers which are examine the impact of role assignment on the tendency highly valuable from their perspective. Second, anchorto initiate action. In particular the following hypothe-ing on the top of the profit schedule list is also expected ses will be tested:
to affect initial offer values: initiators whose schedule starts at the lower end of the profit scale would propose Hypothesis 1. The proportion of initiators is higher among sellers than among buyers.
lower initial offers than initiators whose schedule is formatted in descending order. This would result in a Two candidates for anchoring the negotiation process have been proposed above: the starting level of the difference between initial offer values for buyers and sellers in the two market versions. Hypotheses 4 and profit schedule and the initial offer put forward by the negotiation initiator. The question whether the former 5 sum up the preceding predictions:
anchor (the starting level of the profit schedule) affects supported by the data. Although possibly mediated through initial offers, the effect of format may go be-
INITIAL OFFERS AS MEDIATORS
yond its impact on initial offers, indicating the use of more than a single anchor. The preceding discussion The initial offer itself may serve as an anchor in the suggests the following hypothesis: proceeding stages of the negotiation process. Earlier non-integrative settings, consistently uncovered a positive correlation between opening demands and final Similarly, the initiator's advantage may go beyond agreements (Chertkoff & Conley, 1967 ; Liebert, initial offers. As pointed out earlier, Hypotheses 4 and Smith, & Hill, 1968; Benton, Kelley, & Liebling, 1972) . 6 imply the advantage of taking the initiative. In a The great impact of initial offer on subsequent negotia-simulation which allows for self initiated matching of tion (Rubin & Brown, 1975) has been attributed to the negotiators, initiators are predicted to be more profitmajor role it plays in conveying one's positions and able than non-initiators, simply by virtue of their maksending implicit messages to the opposite party. It may, ing the initial offer. Initiators may, however, also poshowever, be also at least partly related to the anchoring sess personal characteristics which help them handle heuristic. Indeed, initial offer is likely to serve as an the negotiation process, beyond its initial stage, more even more powerful anchor than a preassigned goal. successfully than other negotiators. Indeed, Huber and The present study examines the role of initial offers as Neale (1986) found that Machiavellianism has a poweranchors, using the integrative negotiation paradigm ful effect on negotiators' performance. In their study, developed by Bazerman et al. (1985) .
negotiators who expressed higher degree of belief in Although, as mentioned earlier, previous research their ability to influence other people achieved higher has demonstrated correlation between initial offer and average profit. final profit, this has not yet been shown in integrative It is conceivable that in a competitive market situanegotiation of this type. The question of a possible cor-tion people high in self perceived social influence ability relation between initial offer and final outcome in this would also tend to initiate negotiations more than other type of simulation is more complex. The cognitive effort people. Do personal characteristics, such as Machiavelrequired for constructing offers, which consist of a com-lianism, influence negotiation beyond the impact of inibination of factors may generally reduce the impact of tial offers? As the present study did not involve collecanchors. Furthermore, the fact that the initial offer tion of individual differences data, only indirect evivalues for the two parties are not completely correlated dence concerning this question can be provided. In that gives rise to two separate questions regarding the rela-context, only the following limited hypothesis can be tion between initial offers and final outcomes for initia-tested: tors and non-initiators. In the earlier studies, the iniHypothesis 8. Initiators' final gain is higher than non-initiators' tial offer was typically made by the programmed oppogain, even when initial offer value is controlled. nent. Extending the findings of these studies to the integrative market simulation would imply a correla-
THE ROLE OF EXPERIENCE
tion between initial offer and final profit for the noninitiator. Based on anchoring studies, however, it is reasonable to assume that for the initiator too, the Although the competitive market simulation, as it is value of the initial offer from her perspective would normally run, does not allow for close examination of affect her final outcome. Thus, the following hypothesis the course of a single negotiation, it offers the opportuwill be tested, in the context of the present study:
nity of studying changes in negotiation patterns over repeated negotiations. Past research documented inHypothesis 6. For initiators and non-initiator alike, initial offers crease in joint profit over time, reflecting a move toward affect final agreement, so that higher initial offer value leads to higher final gain.
more integrative agreements (Bazerman et al., 1985) .
This finding is expected to replicate in the present were run at separate locations. Thus, no interaction study. between participants in different versions of the mar-A natural question in the context of the present ket occurred. The number of sellers and buyers in each study concerns the effect of experience on the initia-run of the market was equal. Due to logistic difficulties, tor's advantage. Bazerman et al. (1985) show that the total number of participants in each version of the the increase in joint profit is mostly due to increase market did not come out equal. Three runs of both in the profit of the less successful negotiator, while versions were performed. Altogether 68 subjects particthe profit of the more successful negotiator remains ipated in version 1, and 80 subjects participated in verrelatively stable across trading periods. If initiators sion 2 of the market. are generally the more successful negotiators, then one could infer from the above results the hypothesis Task that non-initiators benefit from experience more than initiators. A more precise formulation of the Bazerman et al. (1985) competitive market simulahypothesis would be: tion was used. Following the assignment of roles, sub- for Buyers and Sellers in each version of the market If, indeed, non-initiators appear to benefit from are given in Table 1 . The instructions specified that a experience more than initiators, this could be due deal requires agreement with respect to each of the to changes in the initial offers submitted to them. three factors: delivery terms, discount level, and finanInitiators may become geared toward presenting cial terms. The profit incurred by each participant is their party with more attractive offers. This suggests the sum of the amounts corresponding to the agreed the last hypothesis to be tested in the present study, level of each factor, as specified in the participant's which is:
profit schedule. As the profit schedules of buyers and sellers are completely symmetrical, ''A-A-A'' and ''E-EHypothesis 10. The value of the initial offers for the non-initiator E'' agreements yield the highest profit ($8000) to one increases with experience more than their value for the initiator.
of the negotiators and the lowest profit ($0) to the other. The present study employed the simulated market A simple compromise solution yields a profit of $4000 exercise, introducing two variations: (a) profit schedule to each. Integrative agreements can yield higher profits format was manipulated between market runs, so that for both parties. In particular ''A-E-I'' agreement yields buyers' schedule was either increasing or decreasing a profit of $5200 to negotiator. (with corresponding changes in the sellers' format); and After having studied the material, subjects were (b) initial offers were recorded as well as final instructed to wear the attached badge indicating agreements. These two methodological variations allow whether they were buyers or sellers. They were then for testing of the hypotheses detailed above.
asked to find themselves partners, and commence negotiation. As in the original simulation, subjects METHOD were allowed to negotiate only one deal with the same partner. Having completed a deal, subjects reSubjects started the search for a new partner. Subjects recorded the deals using prepared forms. For each deal One hundred forty-eight Management and Industhey specified the three dimensions of both the initial trial Engineering students at Ben-Gurion University offer and the final agreement. In addition they were participated in the study, run as a class exercise.
asked to record which of the two parties initiated the Design negotiation.
Subjects were randomly assigned to (1) one of two versions of the market or (2) the role of buyer or seller.
RESULTS
The two versions of the market differed only in the profit schedule format. In the version denoted BISD Three hundred twenty negotiations were recorded. the buyer's schedule was presented in increasing order, All but 14 of these attempts concluded with whereas the seller's schedule was decreasing. The oragreements. The computed profit for buyer and seller der was reversed in the second version, denoted BDSI (buyer decreasing seller increasing). The two version in each agreement record served as the primary mea- Of the 306 completed deal records, 38 either did not the individual member within each pair (buyer vs specify the initiator, or had clearly erroneous initiator seller, or initiator vs non-initiator) was treated as a registration. These records were omitted from further within-subject factor. In order to avoid confusion, these analysis. In the analyses reported henceforth only the factors are referred to as the ''within-pair'' factors, 268 remaining records were considered. whereas the other factors are ''between-pair.'' Hypothesis 1 proposed that the proportion of sellers who initiate negotiation should be higher than the pro-1 In all the analyses reported here, deals were assumed to be indeportion of buyer initiators. This hypothesis was suppendent observations. Since subjects participated in more than one ported by the data. In both markets the proportion of deal each, the above assumption is not strictly correct. A rough estimate of the ratio between the true standard deviation and the esti-initiators among buyers was remarkably lower than mated one was computed to be 1.4. This ratio implies that all effects their proportion among sellers (34% vs 66% in BISD; found to be significant with p value below .005 would still have been 40% vs 60% in BDSI). This finding supports Neale et found significant in more conservative (and more complex) analyses al. 's (1987) hypothesis that sellers are naturally conincluding the subject factor in addition to the other relevant factors.
ceptualized as initiators.
Most of the significant effects in the present study are significant at this level. Other effects should be interpreted with care. Notice that Hypothesis 2, extending Neale et al.'s argument, prousing the individual subject as a unit of analysis (as, for example in posed that initiators' final profit would be higher than Bazerman et al., 1985) does not avoid the problem of non-indepennon-initiators'. Table 2 displays the mean final profit dence (besides being unsuitable for testing some of the hypotheses for initiators and non-initiators in the two markets.
of the present study): although the sellers, for instance, are indepenIndeed, as predicted, initiators obtained higher profits dent, their averaged profit across deals are not independent, since the same buyer contributed to the outcomes of several sellers. Thus, than non-initiators (F(1,264) Å 13.82, p õ .001, in an using the average profit of an individual negotiator as the basic unit ANOVA with buyers' and sellers' profit as dependent of analysis ignores the correlation between the outcomes of the two within-pair measures, and ''market version'' and ''initi- 'initiator' was observed (F(1,264) Å .04, p Å .84). value for the initiator would be higher than its value Profit Schedule Format for the non-initiator. Average initial offer values are Hypothesis 3 stated that the profit schedule format presented in Table 4 . The table clearly shows that, as affects the participant's final profit. Profit schedules in predicted, initial offers are substantially more advan-BISD market were presented in increasing order for tageous for the initiator than for her partner to the buyers, and decreasing order for sellers, and the orders negotiation (F(1,264) Å 139.90, p õ .001, in an analysis were reversed in BDSI market. Hence, Hypothesis 3 of variance of initial offers with assigned role as a implies an interaction between market and partici-within-pair factor and market version and initiator as pant's role. Table 3 displays the average profits for buy-between-pair factors). Thus, Hypothesis 4 is clearly ers and sellers in the two markets. As predicted, sellers' supported by the data. The above analysis also proprofit was higher than buyers' in BISD market, and vided support for Hypothesis 5, which predicted that the order was reversed in BDSI. (F Å (1,264) Å 9.30, initial offer values for buyers and sellers would be afp Å .003 for the interaction between market version fected by the profit schedule presentation format. As and the within-pair factor of ''assigned role'', in the expected, seller's initial offer values were higher in same ANOVA used for testing Hypothesis 2). The aver-BISD than in BDSI, whereas the buyer's initial offer age profit of buyers and sellers across the two markets value was lower in the former than in the latter market were not significantly different (F(1,264) Å .22, p Å (F(1,264) Å 7.34, p Å .007). .64). Hence, the schedule format effect seems present Initial Offers as Mediators even when the initiator factor is controlled for.
Two unpredicted effects were also found significant. Hypothesis 6 proposed that higher values of initial First, participants in BISD earned on the average more offer yield higher values of final agreement. Figure 1 than participants in BDSI (F(1,264) Å 53.81, p õ .001). displays the distribution of final agreement by initial Second, the mean profit for participants was higher offer value, separately for initiators (left panel) and when the buyer initiated negotiation (F(1,264) Å 16.85, non-initiators (right panel). As can be seen in the p õ .001, for the effect ''initiator'', across the within-graph, final profit is correlated with initial offer value pair factor), although this effect occurred mostly in the for both initiators and non-initiators (the computed cor-BDSI market (F(1,264) Å 16.86, p õ .001 for the inter-relation between the participant's initial offer value action of market version and initiator across the and her final profit was .45 for initiators and .53 for within-pair factor).
non-initiators; p õ .001 in both cases).
2

Initial Offers
2 The reported analysis included only the data from negotiations Hypothesis 4 focused on the self-serving nature of in which a deal was reported. Thus, the conclusion that higher initial initial offers. Namely, it suggested that the initial offer offer values lead to higher profit should be conditioned to the cases in which agreement is eventually reached. Initial offers which are highly valued from the perspective of the initiator may, however, . None of these differences were significant, however.
FIG. 1. Distribution of final agreement as a function of initial offer value, plotted separately for initiators (a) and non-initiators (b).
Demonstrating (a) the effect of format on initial offer advantage of the negotiator over her opponent, it may be of considerable practical importance to determine values and (b) a correlation between initial offer value and final agreement still does not preclude the possibil-the impact of the factors examined above for the negotiator's final outcome, regardless of how this outcome ity that the impact of profit schedule format goes beyond it's role in determining initial offers. Hypothesis compares with the opponent's outcome. For that purpose a separate regression analysis was conducted, 7 proposed the possibility that format effects are not wholly mediated through initial offers. If presentation with the initiator's final agreement value as the only dependent variable. A similar analysis employed the format and initiator role significantly interact with the participants' assigned role in predicting final profit, non-initiator's final agreement value as the dependent variable. The coefficients of the regression equations even when initial offer values are controlled, then we may conclude that the impact of these factors goes be-are presented in Table 5 . For the initiator's final profit the only coefficients significantly different from zero yond the opening stage of initial offers. To test this hypothesis a regression analysis was performed, with are the coefficients of the initial offer value for the initiator and the non-initiator. Interestingly, the initial offinal profit for buyer and seller as within-pair dependent variables. The independent variables included initial offer values for buyer and seller as well as market Å .09, for the interaction of initiator with participant's 2 for BDSI; Initiator role Å 1 for buyer, 2 for seller; In.offer-init Å assigned role).
initial offer value for initiator; In.offer-non Å initial offer value for non-initiator.
While the above analysis was concerned with relative fer values for both the initiator and the non-initiator Hypothesis 9 stated the prediction that the increase in final profit due to experience would be less procontribute positively to the final profit. Thus, the initiator's profit increased not only as the initial offer value nounced for initiators than for non-initiators. The plots of mean final profits against deal number are presented for herself increased, but also as the value of the offer for her partner increased. The non-initiator's profit was in Fig. 2 , separately for initiators and non-initiators (marked by the filled circles and filled stars, respecalso positively related to the initial offer value for both partners, although in this case the other factors had a tively). As predicted, joint regression of initiator and non-initiator final profit (as within-pair factor) by deal significant effect as well.
The pragmatic question of what would have been the number revealed a significant interaction of the withinpair factor with deal number (F(1,266) Å 5.033, p Å optimal initial offer in this market simulation can be answered using the above regression model. Given the .026). Indeed, the figure clearly shows that the slope of the regression line for non-initiators' profit is steeper positive regression coefficients it is easy to see that the optimal initial offer was a combination of the highest than the one for initiators. Separate tests of the 'deal number' effect on initiator's and non-initiator's profit levels in the two most important attributes (from the perspective of the initiator), and the lowest level in the yield significant results only in the non-initiator's case (F(1,266) Å .42, p Å .52; F(1,266) Å 19.21, p õ .001 least important attribute. Thus, for example, a buyer in the BISD market had done best, on the average, for the effect of deal number on the initiator and noninitiator, respectively). This result is compatible with when she initially proposed an A-I-I agreement.
In summary, the above analyses reveal the signifi-Bazerman et al.'s finding (Bazerman et al., 1985) that the increase in joint profit over time stemmed from cant role played by the initial offer values for both participants. The final profit for each participant is posi-increase in profit of the less successful rather than the more successful negotiator. As the above analysis inditively affected by the initial offer values both for herself and for her partner to negotiation, although not to the cated, initiators were generally the more successful negotiators. Thus the present finding and Bazerman et same degree. Naturally the participant's own valuation of the initial offer carries more weight than the part-al.'s finding may reflect the same phenomenon.
Hypothesis 10 posed the possibility that the impact ner's valuation. Beyond the initial offer effect, we found only marginal indication of an initiator's relative ad-of experience on initial offers is parallel to the effect found in final outcomes. Initial offer values are depicted vantage. Similarly, the profit schedule format may have a marginal impact on final outcomes, beyond the by the unfilled symbols in Fig. 2 . Consistent with the prediction, joint regression of initiator and non-initiarole it plays in the process of generating initial offers.
The regression analyses described above uncover one tor initial offer value (as within-pair factor) by deal number revealed a significant effect of deal number aspect of the interdependence between the parties to negotiation: the final profit for each participant is af-across the within pair factor (F(1,266) Å 25.13, p õ .001). This effect reflects an increase of initial offer fected not only by the value of the initial offer for herself but also by the offer's value for the other party. values as negotiators gain experience. Furthermore, the analysis also yielded a significant interaction of The impact of learning on the participants' profit, to be discussed next, provides further evidence of this inter-'deal number' with the within-pair factor (F(1,266) Å 8.082, p Å .005). As can be seen in the figure, the value dependence.
of the initial offer from the perspective of the non-initiaThe Role of Experience tor clearly increased with deal number. The initial offer The present study employed a different measure of value for the initiator herself seems to slightly deexperience than the one reported by Bazerman et al. crease, but this change is not quite significant (F(1,266) (1985) . Because exact time of agreement (within each Å 3.659, p õ .001; F(1,266) Å 1.719, p Å .088 for nonperiod of trade) was not duly recorded, the number of initiator and initiator, respectively, in separate regreseach deal in the seller's sequence of reported deals was sions of initial offer value by deal number). Thus, while coded and served as a measure approximating experi-the initiator does not substantially alter the value of ence, instead. In spite of this difference in the coding of her opening offer from her perspective, she learns how experience, the finding that joint profit of participants to construct an offer that would increase her partner's increases as they gain experience (Bazerman et al., profit, without significantly reducing her own. 1985) was replicated in the present study. Regression analysis of joint profit by ''deal number'' showed a sig-Does Experience Lead to Discount of Anchors? nificant contribution of the deal sequential number to predicting the achieved joint profit (F(1,266) Å 29.51, Beyond the changes in initial offers noted above, it is possible that the role of anchors diminishes as one p õ .001).
ity of offers and concession rate on the outcomes of bargaining.
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